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Introduction
This study quantifies the importance of precautionary labor supply, defined as the difference between hours supplied in the presence of risk and hours under perfect foresight. Our findings show that married men choose about 2.5% of their hours of work or one week per year on average to shield against unpredictable wage shocks. This is an important part of the overall precautionary savings workers can accumulate by cutting consumption (see, e.g., Dynan 1993; Gourinchas and Parker 2002; Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln 2005) or working longer hours (Carroll and Kimball 2008) . The current evidence for the importance of overall precautionary saving is mixed, but most studies find that income risk drives households to hold about 20-50% of wealth as a precaution (see, e.g., Carroll and Samwick 1998) . In this study, we quantify the importance of wage risk, that is, the standard deviation of past hourly individual wages, for hours of work and examine how many additional hours of work result from the precautionary motive. This motive may exist if individuals consider their expectations about future wage shocks when deciding how much to work in a given period (Low 2005) . Individuals with higher risk, for instance, the self-employed, would work more hours than those facing lower risks, even before shocks are realized to accumulate precautionary wealth.
Quantifying the relevance of precautionary labor supply is important, from both a theoretical and a policy perspective. Our contribution empirically corroborates the relevance of precautionary labor supply predicted in theoretical studies and provides parameters that rationalize this behavior.
From a policy perspective, our study contributes to a better understanding of the effects of social security. Engen and Gruber (2001) showed that the social security system crowds out precautionary savings. Our study shows that this channel reduces the precautionary part of labor supply and quantifies this effect.
Some theoretical studies suggest that precautionary labor supply is important. Flodén (2006) demonstrates that higher wage risk increases first period labor supply in a two-period model with endogenous savings. Eaton and Rosen (1980) show that wage uncertainty increases labor supply under sufficiently high risk aversion. Pijoan-Mas (2006) shows that 15.2% of work hours are due to lack of insurance in an incomplete markets economy through a calibration exercise. However, this result is not directly comparable to Flodén's concept of precautionary labor supply, where individuals use additional hours of work to increase savings as an insurance device before the realization of wage risk. In this study, we focus on the latter concept of precautionary labor supply, that is, adjustments in work hours to address anticipated, but not yet realized, risks.
There is very little empirical research devoted to this issue, and the scarce evidence is mixed. Pistaferri (2003) finds that the effect of wage risk on labor supply agrees with the theory, but is negligible in practice. In contrast, Parker et al. (2005) show that the self-employed respond to greater earnings risk by working longer hours. Kuhn and Lozano (2008) find that work hours are longer in jobs with higher wage inequality, which could be evidence of precautionary labor supply. Recently, a vibrant debate was sparked by the paradox of toil (Eggertsson 2010) , i.e. the observation that in recessions people work less even though they want to provide a few more hours a week due to the precautionary motive (Mulligan 2010; Eggertsson and Krugman 2012) .
Our study contributes to this literature as the first to empirically quantify the amount of hours worked due to the precautionary motive. We connect insights on intertemporal labor supply choices from the seminal studies of Heckman and Macurdy (1980) , MaCurdy (1981) , and Blundell and Walker (1986) 1 with the literature on the importance of precautionary saving (e.g., Guiso et al. 1992; Dynan 1993; Carroll and Samwick 1997, 1998; Lusardi 1998; Gourinchas and Parker 2002; Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln 2005; Fossen and Rostam-Afschar 2013) .
We estimate the impact of wage risk on hours of work using German SOEP data for 2001 to 2012. Following Altonji (1986) and MaCurdy (1981) , we focus our analysis on married men.
Our measure for idiosyncratic wage risk is based on the variability of previous wage realizations, similar to Parker et al. (2005) . To overcome potential endogeneity issues, we instrument wages and risk measures with lags and lagged labor income. Thus, our results provide causal evidence. To separate wage risk from other determinants of labor supply, we control for a rich set of variables including unemployment probability calculated similar to Carroll et al. (2003) , as the predicted probability not to work in the next period. Since it might be difficult to adjust hours to their desired level instantaneously, we specify dynamic labor supply regressions to capture partial adjustment.
We find that workers choose about 2.5% of their hours of work or one week per year to shield against unpredictable wage shocks. This effect is economically important. Considering a person who works 42 hours per week, precautionary labor supply amounts to about one week per year or in monetary terms, about 710 Euro per year, with a typical net wage rate of 13 Euro. If the selfemployed faced the same wage risk as the median civil servant, their hours of work would drop by 4%. Our findings suggest that unemployment probability also plays a statistically significant role, but is quantitatively less important than wage risk.
To test whether our finding can indeed be interpreted as precautionary labor supply, we run 1 See Card (1994) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a survey.
3 wealth regressions and replicate results from the literature on the size of precautionary savings.
Assuming that half of these savings are precautionary, about one fourth results from precautionary labor supply and the rest from foregone consumption. In a two-period calibration exercise using our estimate for the Frisch labor elasticity (about 20%), we show that these results may be replicated with parameters that are in line with the literature.
The next section derives the empirical specification. Section 3 describes the construction of key variables, the data, and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the estimates and the implications of the dynamic labor supply equations as well as a brief investigation of precautionary savings, and Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Considerations
Consider an individual i who maximizes the discounted sum of utility of all periods t of life in
where c t and h t denote the choice of consumption and hours of work, respectively, in period t. ρ denotes a discount factor and u an instantaneous utility function.
The choices are constrained by the asset accumulation rule
where a t represents assets, r t the real interest rate, n t non-labor income, and M t tax liability, which depends on gross income and household characteristics. The gross wage rate w g t is stochastic. Instantaneous utility takes the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form 
where w it is the real marginal after-tax wage rate of consumer i at age t. 1/γ is the Frisch labor elasticity and the approximation error e it is a function of wage risk (see Low 2005; Domeij and Flodén 2006) . 2 This yields the estimation equation
where X it contains Ξ it as well as a constant and year dummies that capture the second term on the right hand side in equation (1). In the empirical specification, X it includes dummies for children of three age groups (younger than three, between three and five, or between six and 18) in the household, year dummies, years of education, tenure, a dummy for East Germany, age, and age squared in addition to a measure for unemployment probability Pr u,it (see Subsection 3.2). The error term u it contains e it and a measure of wage risk, which we proxy with the term σ w,it . Wage risk is measured as the within standard deviation of the idiosyncratic log wages from the previous five years (see Subsection 3.1. With these terms, the augmented labor supply equation is
where ξ it is the redefined residual of the approximation.
The immediate adjustment labor supply equation is misspecified if individuals cannot adjust their hours of work immediately, for example, because hours of work are negotiated centrally for many occupations in Germany or because of the "paradox of toil" (Eggertsson 2010) . To allow for this possibility, we specify a partial adjustment model. Denote the desired labor supply by ln h * it :
where v it is an error term. A simple partial adjustment mechanism employed by, for example, Robins and West (1980) , Euwals (2005) , and Baltagi et al. (2005) , is given by
θ may be interpreted as the speed of adjustment. This speed might be determined by costs to immediately adjust the labor supply to desired hours or habit persistence (see, e.g., Brown 1952) .
Replace (5) in (4) to obtain the partial adjustment labor supply specification as in, for example, Baltagi et al. (2005) :
The parameters of (4) can be recovered following the estimation of (6) with α = 1 − θ , β 1 = θβ 1 , β 2 = θβ 2 , β 3 = θβ 3 , β 4 = θβ 4 , µ i = θμ i , and ω it = θ v it (Baltagi et al. 2005) . The partial adjustment model nests the classic labor supply equation with θ = 1 as a special case. Taking the first differences of equation (6), we obtain our empirical labor supply equation:
In specification (7), the short-run labor supply elasticity is given by SR η w = β 1 , and the shortrun labor supply elasticity with respect to risk by SR η σ w = β 3 . The corresponding long-run elastic-
3 Empirical Strategy
Measurement of Wage Risk
We use data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) described in Subsection 3.4 to construct measures for both gross and marginal net wage risk. We calculate gross wages by dividing gross labor income by hours of work (see Subsection 3.4 for details). While we focus on net wages, we show results with gross wages as a robustness test. We calculate marginal net wage rates by scaling the gross wage y it /h it with the marginal net-of-tax rate:
that is, we increase each person's annual labor income y it marginally. 3 We calculate net income
NetInc using the microsimulation model STSM. Jessen et al. (2015) present a comprehensive overview of marginal tax rates for different households (for more information, see Steiner et al. (2012) ).
To obtain measures of wage risk we detrend, in a first step, log gross wage growth with a regression on age, its square, education, and interactions of these variables to avoid variations due to predictable wage growth, following, for instance, Hryshko (2012) . In a second step, we obtain the sample standard deviation of the detrended log wage for each person for rolling sample windows of the previous 5 years similar to Parker et al. (2005) . 4 Hence, our risk measure uses only the variation within individuals. The wage risk measure is given by 3 We set ∆y it = 2000 Euro, which implies an increase in labor income of about 40 Euro per week. 4 We use the remaining observed past wages for missing observations. 6
wherew j denotes the detrended (net or gross) wage. The idea behind this measure is that workers use past variations in idiosyncratic wages to form expectations about future risk. Therefore, we may treat this measure as exogenous at the moment of the labor supply decision. We denote this measure by σ w,it . For the estimations, we standardize the risk measure by one standard deviation of the sample used in the regression to facilitate interpretation. We provide robustness tests with different risk measures, such as without detrending, subjective risk measures, or other household income risk in the Appendix in Table A5 .
We divide our sample into blue collar workers, white collar workers, civil servants, and selfemployed. Since we are mainly interested in decisions during work life at ages where occupational changes are rare, we leave extending our model to incorporate occupational choice to future research. This does not impair our results because we eliminate person-specific fixed effects and our risk measure is based on within-variation of wages. Figure 1 shows how the average net wage risk evolves over the life cycle for each subgroup. Only age-occupation combinations with more than 15 observations are displayed, thus the trajectory for self-employed starts at age 35. As expected, the hourly wages of self-employed workers are more volatile over the entire life cycle than those of employees. Blue and white collar workers have similar levels of wage risks. For most age groups, the average net wage risk of civil servants is slightly lower than those of blue collar and white collar workers.
Measurement of Unemployment Probability
The control variable unemployment probability Pr U,it is estimated similarly as in Carroll et al. (2003) . We use a heteroskedastic probit model to estimate the probability of unemployment in the following year conditional on regressors for occupation, industry, region, education, age, age squared, age interacted with occupation, and with education, marital status, unemployment experience, and gender. The vector of regressors of the heteroskedasticity function includes previous unemployment experience and years of education. 
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This predicted probability Pr U,it is then used as a regressor in our hours of work regressions. 5
Note that we exploit the panel structure of the SOEP to estimate the conditional probability of unemployment in the future rather than simply the unconditional probability of current unemployment. Pr U,it can be thought of as a rational expectation of the odds of a currently working individual not to be working next year. 
Instrumentation and Estimation Methods
To estimate equation (7), we need to account for several endogeneity problems. First, the first difference of the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term ε it , which includes shocks from t − 1. We follow Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and solve this problem by applying the method of instrumental variables, where we use the level ln h it−2 as the excluded instrument (Anderson-Hsiao estimator) . In an alternative specification, we exploit additional moment conditions as suggested by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) and apply the two-step difference GMM estimator (DIFF-GMM) with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that imposing additional restrictions on the initial values of the data generating process and using lagged levels and lagged differences as instruments improves the efficiency of the estimates. We also present the results from this estimator, called the system GMM (SYS-GMM). Following Roodman (2009), we collapse the matrix of instruments. 5 For currently working individual i, we assume a latent variable U * it = Z U it α U + ζ it such that U * it > 0 if the person will not be working in the following year and U * it ≤ 0 otherwise. We assume ζ it is a normally distributed idiosyncratic shock that is uncorrelated with Z U it , a row vector of observable characteristics for individual i at time t. Following Harvey (1976) , we allow the variance to vary with independent variables W it such that σ 2 it = [exp(W it γ U )] 2 . Therefore,
where Φ() is the cumulative distribution function of a normal random variable. The dependent variable is an indicator that takes on a value of 1 if individual i works in year t and does not work in year t + 1, and takes on a value of 0 if individual i works in both periods. 9 Second, marginal net wage rates may be endogenous for two reasons: First, measurement error in hours leads to downward denominator bias in the coefficient of wage rate since the hourly wage is calculated by dividing labor income by the dependent variable hours of work (cf. Altonji 1986; Keane 2011). Second, the marginal net wage depends on the choice of hours because of the nonlinear tax and transfer system. Therefore, we instrument marginal net wages with the first lag of net labor income. This variable is predetermined during the current period labor supply choices and uncorrelated with the measurement error in current period hours.
Data
Our study uses data from the SOEP (version 30), a representative annual panel survey in Germany. The sample is restricted to prime age (older than 25 and younger than 56) married men working at least 20 hours to allow comparisons with the canonical labor supply literature, for example, Altonji (1986) and MaCurdy (1981) . 6 Further, we drop persons who indicated having received social welfare payments. We restrict our sample to individuals working between 20 and 80 hours per week. In total, we observe 10,987 data points from 2,488 persons. Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes the number of observations lost due to each sample selection. Euwals (2005) . 8 The general aim is to account for differences in compensation for overtime hours. We use paid hours because an increase in these translates directly into an increase 6 Including unmarried men yields very similar results, available upon request. in income. Robustness tests using different measures of hours supplied are reported in Table A4 .
The last three variables in Table 1 show that our sample has 6.5% self-employed workers, about 32.7% blue collar workers, and about 48% white collar workers. Self-employed workers include freelance professionals and other self-employed persons. Blue collar workers include untrained and trained workers. White collar workers are employees with simple tasks, untrained and trained employees with simple tasks, qualified and highly qualified professionals, and managerial staff. (3) while columns 4-6 show results for the preferred dynamic specification (7). 10 The first column displays results for the pooled OLS. The coefficient of net wage is significantly negative, which is not in line with standard theoretical predictions and likely to be a result of the denominator bias described in Subsection 3.3. The main coefficient of interest is the one associated with wage risk. The coefficient of 0.021 indicates that an increase in wage risk by one standard deviation would increase labor supply by 2.1%. The coefficient on unemployment probability is very small and not statistically significant.
Results

Impact of Wage Risk on Weekly Hours of Work
Column 2 shows results for the pooled 2SLS estimator 11 , where net wage is instrumented with lagged net labor income to overcome the denominator bias. As expected, the sign of the coefficient of net wage becomes positive and the coefficient of wage risk remains significantly positive with a point estimate of 0.028. The unemployment probability becomes significant and the point estimate of 0.016 implies that an increase in unemployment probability by one standard deviation translates into 1.6% more hours worked. Column 3 displays the results obtained with the first difference that overtime rule (a) applies. Therefore, we can approximate paid hours of work as h it = hc it + I(or it = a)(ht it − hc it ) + 0.5I(or it = c)(ht it − hc it ), where hc it are contracted hours of work and ht it are actual hours of work.
9 Table A4 in the Appendix shows the results for alternative definitions of hours of work.
10 Table A2 in the Appendix shows the equivalent table using gross wages instead of marginal net wages. 11 We estimate it using the ivreg2 package (Baum et al. 2016 ).
estimator (FD-IV) with the equivalent instrument for net wages. The wage risk coefficient drops slightly but remains significantly positive.
The partial adjustment specification results appear in columns 4-6 with the Anderson-Hsiao estimator displayed in column 4 and the results for the Difference and System GMM estimators 12 displayed in columns 5 and 6, respectively. The immediate adjustment specification is rejected with all three estimators with point estimates of lagged hours of work between 0.12 and 0.16.
For all three dynamic estimators, the coefficients of wage risk and unemployment probability are statistically significant. The magnitude of these effects is similar across all dynamic specifications and close to the results of the immediate adjustment specifications. The coefficient of marginal net wage is significant only for the system GMM estimator, implying a short run elasticity of SR η w = 0.175 and a long run elasticity of LR η w = 0.20. For the difference and system GMM estimators, autocorrelation and Hansen tests appear below the estimates. The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of second order cannot be rejected and the Hansen overidentification test does not indicate any invalidity in the instruments. 12 We estimate them using the xtabond2 package (Roodman 2009 ). 
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Importance of Precautionary Labor Supply
With our estimates of the wage risk semi-elasticity we can quantify the importance of precautionary labor supply in a ceteris paribus exercise. We use the estimates to simulate the resulting distribution of hours if all individuals faced the same small wage risk. We construct this simulated counterfactualĥ it from the prediction of equation (7) with minimum sample wage risk σ min w,it . We use the estimates obtained with the System GMM estimator. We then compare actual hours of work h it observed in the data with their simulated counterfactuals. The difference gives us a measure of the magnitude of precautionary labor supply and, for the short-run, is calculated aŝ 
The short-run simulated hours lie to the left of the actual hours distribution. The horizontal difference between short-run simulated points and observed points indicates the reduction in the number of hours in the short run if wage risk were reduced to the minimum level. The long-run simulated hours lie to the left of both the actual hours distribution and the short-run simulated points. The horizontal difference between long-run simulated points and observed points indicates the reduction in the number of hours of work in the long-run if wage risk were reduced to the 13 Infinite horizon models with patient consumers, that is, whose time preference rate is equal to or less than the interest rate, may describe the behavior of dynasties or central planners but are empirically not relevant for individual consumers because patient consumers accumulate assets indefinitely such that income and thus precautionary labor supply becomes irrelevant as capital income increasingly finances consumption (Deaton 1991 (Deaton , 1992 . Therefore, consumers must be impatient to desire to borrow. With borrowing constraints, precautionary labor supply may be empirically relevant. Carroll (1997) 
Results by Occupations
The key results in Table 3 differ across occupational groups due to differences in wage risk. To quantify this heterogeneity across groups, we present the results of our preferred specification across the groups introduced above and other occupational classifications. Table 4 provides separate results for different occupational groups using the system GMM estimator with the same instruments as in Table 2 . 15 As before, the risk measures are normalized by one standard deviation; however, this time not by the overall, but the sub-sample specific standard deviation. The point estimate of the wage risk coefficient is positive and statistically significant for self-employed, whitecollar, and blue-collar workers, but not statistically different from zero for civil servants. The point estimate is largest for self-employed workers (0.035) and much smaller for white-collar (0.010) and blue-collar workers (0.007), suggesting the important role of precautionary labor supply for the self-employed. The coefficient on the lag of paid hours worked is not statistically significant for the self-employed and civil servants, which makes intuitive sense. These two groups are not as severely constrained in their hours choices as regular employees. Blue-collar workers (0.228) are more constrained than white-collar workers (0.123). The coefficient of net wage is positive and statistically significant for all groups.
The coefficient of net wage, that is, the Frisch elasticity, is positive and significant for all groups. It is higher for civil servants than for other occupational groups. This makes intuitive sense, as the Frisch elasticity is given by 1/γ and a large "risk aversion with respect to leisure" implies a high Frisch elasticity. Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) document self-selection into public service by individuals with high risk aversion. As in the estimation using the entire sample, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of second order. The Hansen test indicates that the instrument may be invalid only for blue-collar workers. Each one-digit ISCO group is composed of several of the occupational classifications we used above, that is, some managers are self-employed, some not. The null hypothesis that wage risk does not affect labor supply is rejected for managers, professionals, technicians, craftsmen, and operatives. The coefficient of net wage is significantly positive for all but service workers and operatives. Generally, both the coefficients of net wage risk and net wage are of similar magnitude as 15 Results obtained using gross wages instead of net wages appear in Table A3 in the Appendix. Notes: Estimation of equation (7) using the SYS-GMM as in column 6, Table 2 . Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 those obtained in the estimation using the main sample. None of the specification tests rejects the validity of the estimator. Notes: Estimation of equation (7) using the SYS-GMM as in column 6, Table 2 . Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
Does Precautionary Labor Supply Show Up in Savings?
In this subsection, we test whether our results for precautionary labor supply appear in precautionary saving. Additional hours worked can only be interpreted as precautionary labor supply if they lead to more savings. Therefore, precautionary savings must be influenced by the measure of wage risk that also affects labor supply. We test this restriction by regressing log net wealth on wage risk, unemployment probability, log of disposable household income, and the same control variables as in Subsection 4.1. 16 Table 6 presents estimates obtained using the first-difference estimator (FD) and the fixed effects estimator (Fixed Effects). The coefficient of wage risk can be interpreted as the percentage change in net wealth if wage risk increases by one sample standard deviation. The point estimate suggests that this effect is about 9%. A comparison between actual net wealth and counterfactual net wealth at minimum wage risk shows that precautionary wealth amounts to 22,216 Euro and 22,312 Euro on average with fixed effects and first differences, respectively. This amount covers average consumption expenditures for about 9 months. However, the standard errors are too large to obtain statistical significance.
While our estimates are statistically insignificant, the confidence interval includes findings from the literature. Guiso et al. (1992) estimate the precautionary component of net wealth at only 2%. Lusardi (1998) uses net wealth as well and finds precautionary wealth of 1% to 3.5%. (2005); Bartzsch (2008); Geyer (2011); Lusardi (1997); Carroll and Samwick (1998) estimate precautionary savings for German, Italian, and U.S. households to be in the range of 20-50%.
Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln
In our sample, average monthly savings are about 450 Euro. Assuming that 50% of these savings are due to the precautionary motive implies that overall precautionary savings amount to 225 Euro per month. Table 1 shows that men in our sample work an average of about 42 hours per week and earn an hourly marginal net wage of about 13 Euro. With our estimate of the share of precautionary weekly hours of 2.5% (Table 3) , precautionary savings due to precautionary labor supply are 59 Euro per month or 26% of precautionary savings. If only 20% of total savings are due to precaution, precautionary labor supply amounts to 66% of precautionary savings. 
A Calibration Exercise
The result that 26% of precautionary savings is due to precautionary labor supply is consistent with a simple simulation exercise of a two-period version of our model in Section 2. 17 We set certain wages in the first period to 13 Euro, the hourly marginal net wage in the sample (Table 1 ). In the second period, wage realizations of 8 Euro or 18 Euro are possible with equal probability. We take the Frisch labor supply elasticity 1/γ from the main results in Subsection 4.1 as 0.20. We calibrate the coefficient of relative risk aversion ϑ and the parameter b to match the observed mean weekly hours of work (Table 1 ). The respective values of the parameters are -1.67, and 2.5 × 10 −12 . 18 We restrict the discount rate ρ to one and the interest rate r to zero. Therefore, the precautionary motive is the only reason to save.
We solve for the optimal solution under both uncertainty and certainty algebraically. Under certainty, where the second period wage is 13 Euro, the first and second period labor supply are the same, h 1 = h 2 = 42.42 hours per week and savings s = 0 Euro. Under uncertainty, the first period labor supply is h 1 = 43.60 weekly hours, the second period labor supply h 2 = 41.62 weekly 17 We assume that second period labor supply is chosen before wages are known.
18 Chetty (2006) shows that commonly estimated labor supply elasticities are in line with ϑ > −2.
hours, and savings s = 59.11 Euro. The difference in first period labor supply under uncertainty and certainty gives precautionary labor supply per week. In this simulation, it is 1.19 weekly hours, which is in line with the results in Section 4.2. With an hourly wage of 13 Euro, the sample average, this implies that 26.08% of precautionary savings are due to precautionary labor supply.
In this simulation, 73.92% are due to cuts in consumption.
Summary and Conclusions
We quantify the importance of wage risk to explain the hours of work of married men. The analysis is based on German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) data for 2001 to 2012. We find that workers choose slightly more than an hour per week to shield against unpredictable wage shocks. Workers adjust hours of work with changes in idiosyncratic wage risk. These effects are statistically significant for various occupations, but not for civil servants, which is in line with previous studies. We observe the largest absolute and relative effects of wage risk for the self-employed.
Labor supply adjustments to wage risk can only be interpreted as precautionary labor supply if savings react to wage risk as well. Therefore, we run wealth regressions and replicate results from the literature on the size of precautionary savings. While the resulting coefficients are not statistically different from zero, the confidence intervals include results from the literature. Assuming that about 50% of savings are due to the precautionary motive, we show that about 26% of precautionary savings are due to precautionary labor supply.
To verify that our estimated results are in line with theoretical predictions, we calibrate a simple two period model. Using realistic parameters of the utility function, including our estimate of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, we replicate our empirical finding that about a quarter of precautionary savings are due to precautionary labor supply.
Precautionary labor supply is economically important, particularly for the self-employed, a group that faces average wage risks substantially above the sample mean. This group works 5.53%
of their hours because of the precautionary motive. If all workers faced the same risk as the median civil servant, hours worked would decrease on average by 1% in the long run.
Appendix
A Sample Restrictions (3) Columns 4-6: Estimation of equation (7) using different estimators. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Notes: Estimation of equation (7) using the SYS-GMM as in column 6, Table 2 . Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table A5 shows our preferred specification (System GMM), but with four different risk specifications. Column 1 shows the case with constructed risk measures, as before, but omitting the detrending of wages. This measure corresponds to the one used by Parker et al. (2005) . 19 Columns 2 and 3 include indicators of subjective risk preference (Some Worries, Big Worries), column 4 includes the risk of additional household income as an additional control. This is constructed as for wage risk, but using net household income minus net labor income of the household head instead of the household head's wage. 
C Robustness of Results
